2025年1月8日将是“中拉论坛”正式运营十周年。十年来，论坛有力推动了中拉整体合作和双边合作进入“快轨道”，中国成为拉美主要经济体巴西、智利、秘鲁等国的第一大贸易伙伴国，中拉年贸易额有望突破5000亿美元。面对“后院”中国因素的快速增长以及美国掌控力的下降，美国政学商界五味杂陈，总体呈现“舒适度递减、对冲呼声递增”的态势。
梳理近年美国各界对于中拉关系快速升温的观点与主张，新旧论调大体分为四类。
其一，中国这个“新邻居”已成为美国西半球战略安全的最大威胁。这类观点声称，中国在拉美的投资项目军民两用，深空间、资源卫星、5G技术、港口等项目夹带军事目的，已经冲击美国西半球的安全屏障，必须重拾“门罗主义”以应对中国这个不速之客。
其二，“后院”日益增长的中国因素具有扭转拉美民主进程的风险。这类观点声称，中国投资拉美带来的“软实力”“巧实力”效应不断显现，相比中国资本输出，更可怕的是中国模式的输出。智利总统博里奇对中国治国理政经验感兴趣表明，拉美的民主发展进程很可能打上“中国烙印”。
其三，中国在拉美的存在是“积极因素”。这类观点认为，鉴于美拉地理相邻的天然优势以及长久的历史文化联系，中国无法取代美国在拉美的独特角色和地缘政治地位，而中国投资拉动了拉美经济发展，提升了就业，有助于减轻美国帮扶“后院”的负担。
其四，“中国因素未定论”。这类观点认为，现在判断“后院”中国因素的好坏为时尚早，应密切观察中国因素日后的动向及变化。
上述四类观点在美国各有市场，但第一、第二类近年甚嚣尘上。为对冲“后院”迅猛增长的中国因素，拜登执政四年期间对美拉关系进行较大幅度的调整。拜登以“精通拉美事务”自诩，宣布“美国回来了”。为呼应拉美国家与美国平等相处的诉求，拜登特地宣称拉美不再是美国的“后院”而是“前院”。2022年，拜登在美洲峰会上宣布建立“美洲经济繁荣伙伴关系”（APEP），旨在加大对拉美基础设施和可持续发展领域的投入力度，此举被广泛认为剑指中国在拉美推行的“一带一路”。2024年，美国“重返拉美”势头持续，不但通过美洲开发银行等金融机构在拉美落实APEP，国务卿布林肯还宣布考虑接纳阿根廷为APEP成员。此外，美国在全球产业链重构过程中将“近岸外包”拓展为“友岸外包”，声称此举将惠及更多拉美国家，助推地区国家的经济复苏和就业增长。不久前，美国又联手美洲开发银行推出“芯片法案”，实施西半球半导体计划，意在与墨西哥、巴拿马、哥斯达黎加等拉美国家建立芯片联盟。凡此种种表明，拜登政府已接纳国内政学界批评“美国的傲慢和疏忽将拉美推向中国怀抱”的观点，明显加大了对“后院”的投入与关注。
特朗普2.0时期即将开启，这并不意味特朗普将抛弃拜登的“后院”政策。美国党争虽然激烈，但两党在维护美国在“后院”的战略利益上有一定共识，均主张维持“门罗主义”，力防域外大国深度染指其势力范围。可以预见，特朗普新政会部分沿用拜登的“后院”政策，很有可能续推其第一任期时提出的“美洲增长倡议”，该倡议意在加大美国对拉美能源和基础设施领域的投资，以此制衡不断扩大的“一带一路”影响力。此外，特朗普尚未上任便放话对墨西哥产品加征关税，有意打击中国输美产品转口墨西哥的避税行为。因此，特朗普2.0时期不会乐见中国毫无障碍地成为美国的“新邻居”，力防中国挑战其西半球利益的战略红线不会改变，关税、制裁、贸易保护主义等经济手段将成为特朗普制衡中拉关系升温的主要手段。
面对中美大国博弈，拉美国家大多心态复杂，既有“大象打架殃及草地”的担忧，又有“大国相争从中渔利”的期待，因此，地区国家大多采取务实的“大国平衡”战略。近年来，拉美政治生态发生变化，左翼掌控地区政治版图，美拉关系凸现新态势，拉美国家时常联动对美说“不”，地区国家战略自主意识空前增强，美国掌控“后院”愈发力不从心，美国不再是美拉关系的单方决定性因素。在近年来的“中美拉”三角关系中，拉美国家“向东看”的态势明显。拉美国家认为，相较于美国，中国的投资和贸易双轮齐驱，搭乘“中国经济快车”是拉美发展不可多得的机遇，“走近中国”正成为越来越多拉美国家的战略选择。
如何正确处理中拉关系中的“美国因素”，不但是中拉双方的战略考量，更应是美国方面的反思。美国在拉美影响力下降的根源在于其错误的邻国战略定位，因为拉美不是任何国家的“后院”。邻国相处之道在于以邻为伴、与邻为善的王道而非任性妄为的霸道，美国应及时反思自身在拉美的历史和现实行径，而中国不应成为“替罪羊”。拉美不是中美博弈的竞技场，而应当是双方合作的桥梁。特朗普2.0时期，中美双方应重启“中美拉美事务磋商机制”，消除误判，增加共识，照顾拉美关切，在中美拉三方合作中努力实现各自利益最大化。
The China-Latin America Forum will celebrate its 10th anniversary on Jan. 8. Over the past decade, the it has pushed overall China-Latin America cooperation and corresponding bilateral cooperation onto a fast track. China has become the No.1 trading partner of such major Latin American economies as Brazil, Chile and Peru, and annual China-Latin America trade is expected to surpass $500 billion a year. Facing the rapidly growing China factor in its backyard, as well as declining control, U.S. political and academic circles have mixed feelings, displaying a general tendency of decreasing comfort, and rising calls to hedge.
Opinion in the United States about the rapid warming of China-Latin America relations over the past few years can be grouped into four categories:
• China becoming a “new neighbor” has made it the biggest threat to U.S. strategic security in the Western Hemisphere. Those holding this view claim that Chinese-invested projects in Latin America are dual-used civilian and military. Such projects involve deep space, satellites and 5G technology. At the same time, this view holds that ports have military purposes behind them and endanger U.S. safety barriers in the Western Hemisphere. Therefore the U.S. must return to the Monroe Doctrine to cope with China the uninvited guest.
• The growing China factor in America's backyard poses the potential risk of reversing democratic processes in Latin America. This view holds that as Chinese investment in Latin America continues to show the effects of soft and smart power, compared with China's capital exports, there's greater reason for concern. Chilean President Gabriel Boric's interest in China's national governance experience indicates that the Latin American process of democratic development may carry some Chinese marks.
• China's presence in Latin America is a positive factor. Those with this opinion believe, given the natural advantage of Latin America's geographical proximity and longstanding historical and cultural connections, that China will be unable to dislodge America's peculiar role and geopolitical status in the region, let alone Chinese investments have promoted economic development, increased employment and are conducive to reducing the U.S. burden of shoring up its neighbors.
• The impact of the China factor is undetermined. Those holding this opinion contend that it is still too early to tell whether the China factor in the U. S. backyard is good or bad, so America's future orientation and changes require close observation.
Each of the four categories has its own audience in the United States, but the first and second categories have gained the upper hand in recent years. During the four years of the Joe Biden presidency, the U.S. has dramatically adjusted its Latin America policies to hedge against the fast-growing China factor in its backyard. Biden has prided himself on familiarity with Latin American affairs and declared that “America is back.” To answer Latin American countries' appeals for equal footing with the U.S., Biden has claimed Latin America is no longer the backyard of the U.S. but rather its “front court.”At the 2022 Summit of the Americas events, Biden announced the establishment of the APEP, which is aimed at increasing input in Latin American infrastructure and sustainable development — and are thought to be targeting the Belt and Road Initiative projects China has been promoting in the region. This “return to Latin America” sustained its momentum in 2024, as the U.S. has not only implemented the APEP in the region through such financial institutions as the Inter-American Development Bank but Secretary of State Antony Blinken also announced that the government is considering the acceptance of Argentina as an APEP member.Moreover, the U.S. has expanded near-shoring to become friend-shoring in the reshuffle of global supply chains, claiming the move will benefit more Latin American nations by facilitating economic recovery and job growth. Not long ago, the U.S. joined hands with the IDB to launch the CHIPS ITSI program to collaborate on semiconductor initiative in the Western Hemisphere, intending to build a chips alliance with such Latin American nations as Mexico, Panama and Costa Rica.Such moves show that the Biden administration has explicitly accepted domestic political and academic circles' criticism that U.S. arrogance and neglect have pushed Latin America into China's embrace.
The U.S. is on the threshold of Trump 2.0, but this doesn't mean Trump will scrap Biden's backyard policy. Despite their fierce infighting, the Democratic and Republican parties maintain a certain consensus on preserving U.S. strategic interests in its backyard. Both insist on maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, and striving to prevent extra-regional powers from getting involved deeply in its sphere of influence.Predictably, the incoming Trump administration will partially inherit Biden's backyard policy and possibly continue the Growth in the Americas initiative launched during his first term in office. That initiative is intended to boost U.S. investment in Latin American energy and infrastructure to balance the growing influences of China's Belt and Road Initiative.In addition, even before his inauguration, Trump has clamored to impose tariffs on Mexican exports, in an attempt to crack down on Chinese exports that are re-exported via Mexico for purposes of tax evasion. Therefore, under Trump 2.0, the United States will not want to see China become its new neighbor. Its strategic red line, striving to prevent China from challenging its Western Hemisphere interests, will not change, and such economic means as tariffs, sanctions and trade protectionism will become Trump's main tools for constraining the warming China-Latin America relations.
Facing the China-U.S. power game, most Latin American nations have mixed feelings: They worry about suffering collateral damage, and they wish to profit from the major power rivalry. Therefore, most of them have adopted a strategy of balance between the two powers.Latin America's political biosphere has changed in recent years: The left wing has controlled the local political landscape, and U.S.-Latin America relations have shown new dynamics. Latin American nations frequently say no to the U.S., and their awareness of strategic autonomy has grown, with the U.S. increasingly unable to control its backyard. It is no longer the decisive factor in U.S.-Latin America relations.Latin American nations have demonstrated an obvious tendency to “look east” recently in the triangular China-U.S.-Latin America relationship. Latin American countries believe that taking advantage of Chinese investment and trade, as well as riding China's economic express, are precious opportunities for Latin American development. Approaching China is becoming a strategic choice for ever more Latin American nations.
How to correctly handle the U.S. factor in China-Latin America relations should not just be a strategic consideration for both the Chinese and Latin American sides. It is also worthy of reflection on the U.S. side. Declining U.S. influence in Latin American is rooted in its mistaken strategic positioning of neighboring countries, because Latin America is not America's backyard. The way to get along with neighbors is to treat them nicely as equal partners, rather than bullying them. This is the difference between kingly ways and a tyrant's ways.The U.S. should reflect on its historical and current conduct in Latin America. China should not become a scapegoat. Latin America should not be an arena for China-U.S. wrangling but rather a bridge for bilateral cooperation. During Trump 2.0, the two governments should reactivate the mechanism of bilateral consultation on Latin American affairs, eliminate misjudgments, increase consensus, consider Latin American concerns and optimize their respective interest in China-U.S.-Latin America trilateral cooperation.
